Question need to be asked "Just how easy is it to rig the NSW Legislative Council election?
The reality is its quite easy if you have access to the data file and no one else has copies of the data so a comparison cannot be made.
The NSW "Below-the-line" preference data fiels that habve just been released exclude preferences recorded as being informal. Votes where a preference has been omitted or duplicated. This could be as a result of a data-entry or voter error.
Without access to the missing data it is impossible to verify the quality of the data recorded.
What’s even more scary is that if a person had access to the original data file they could easily run a simple query against the data set, removing preferences for a given candidate where that candidate has a higher preference than another candidate. The number of primary votes would still be the same but the ballot paper would exhaust during the count if the preference order had been altered in any way.
Unless you are able to undertake a comprehensive audit or a random check it would be impossible to verify the correctness of the data recorded. The only means if validating the integrity of the election is to rely on the overall data network security and any log files that might provide a forensic trail to any wrong doing. Problem is this that access oog files are not available to scrutineers.
The risk of data being altered is increased if copies of the data files are denied or only made available after the conclusion of the count. All that would be distributed after the count is the altered data file with no means of checking that the data is infact correct
The preferred option and best means of protecting the integrity of the data file is to make copies of the file available, showing all preferences (Including informal and mismatched data-entry preference,) progressively throughout the data-entry process.
Publication of progressive compilation of the data limits the time and opportunity available to alter the data records, Scrutineers would have access to a copies and can monitor and perform random or structured data quality checks as the count progresses. Any close calls would signal warning and alert scruineers and analysts to pay closer attention in the review.
The fact that the data files have not been readily available during the count leaves the system wide open to potential misuse and abuse.
The Electoral Commissionm of course, prefers that no one has access to this information in which case there would be no means of challenge the accuracy and validity of the count. What they do not know can not be questioned.
One thing is clear, If we are to maintain confidence in the electronic counting of our votes the system needs to be designed as such that it is much more open and transparent. The current procedures and practices are far from open and transparent.
In the absence of Electoral Commission's implementing procedures that ensure that data is more readily available and subject to proper and fill scrutiny, Parliaments will have to review the detailed procedures and legislate to protect the system from possible corruption and abuse.
What’s needed is a comprehensive independent Parliamentary review of the processes and procedures in the conduct of electronic elections.
We certainly should not be complacent or lulled into a false sense of security thinking that the system is protected by itself, the fact is it is not.
They said the Titanic was unsinkable. History has proven otherwise. We only need to look at the mistakes made in the 2006 Victorian State Election to realise the extent of errors that can and do occur in an electonic counted election .
Showing posts with label Electronic voting. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Electronic voting. Show all posts
Friday, August 5, 2011
Thursday, December 16, 2010
Assessing Electoral Fraud in New Democracies
Steve Tully's refusal to provide copies of the below-the-line preference data files to scrutineers and his failure to publish this information had prevented scrutineers from properly scrutinising the Victorian Legilsative Council election.
There is no excuse or reason why this information was not made available. Similar complaints and concerns had been made about the Victoria's previous state and municipal elections.
In 2006 The Victorian Electoral Commission refused to publish copies of the preference data-files. When the commission was asked for copies of the data-files by the Victorian Parliamentary Electoral Matters Commission, Steve Tully said that the data files pertaining to the primary count A for Western Metropolitan had been deleted. overwritten and that there were no backup copies available. The Commission failed to ensure that this data was protected and copies available in spite the fact that this information had been requested prior to the conduct of the count.
The Chief Electoral Commissioner has demonstrated for a second election in a row that he is incapable of self regulating or ensuring that our electoral process in Victoria is open and transparent.
Parliament must now act to ensure the integrity of the electronic counting system is maintained and that scrutineers have access to this crucial data in real time.
There are no technical or procedural reasons why this data cannot be made available and published on line as and when it is recorded. In the same way that polling place results are published on line as the count progresses.
The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) has just published a white paper on which it addresses some of the growing concerns about about fraud in electronic elections. One of the issues raised is the need to ensure that the election process is open and transparent and that the tallies of electronic counting systems are subject to proper scrutiny and audit by political parties and the need for publication of elections results to be progressively made available during the count.
December 2010
As the topic of electoral fraud has gained prominence in the media and the international discourse, IFES is releasing a series of three white papers introducing a groundbreaking framework for deterring this corrosive practice.
Assessing Electoral Fraud in New Democracies: A Basic Conceptual Framework, the first paper in the series:
There is no excuse or reason why this information was not made available. Similar complaints and concerns had been made about the Victoria's previous state and municipal elections.
In 2006 The Victorian Electoral Commission refused to publish copies of the preference data-files. When the commission was asked for copies of the data-files by the Victorian Parliamentary Electoral Matters Commission, Steve Tully said that the data files pertaining to the primary count A for Western Metropolitan had been deleted. overwritten and that there were no backup copies available. The Commission failed to ensure that this data was protected and copies available in spite the fact that this information had been requested prior to the conduct of the count.
The Chief Electoral Commissioner has demonstrated for a second election in a row that he is incapable of self regulating or ensuring that our electoral process in Victoria is open and transparent.
Parliament must now act to ensure the integrity of the electronic counting system is maintained and that scrutineers have access to this crucial data in real time.
There are no technical or procedural reasons why this data cannot be made available and published on line as and when it is recorded. In the same way that polling place results are published on line as the count progresses.
The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) has just published a white paper on which it addresses some of the growing concerns about about fraud in electronic elections. One of the issues raised is the need to ensure that the election process is open and transparent and that the tallies of electronic counting systems are subject to proper scrutiny and audit by political parties and the need for publication of elections results to be progressively made available during the count.
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Assessing Electoral Fraud in New Democracies:
A Basic Conceptual Framework
By Rafael López-PintorA Basic Conceptual Framework
December 2010
As the topic of electoral fraud has gained prominence in the media and the international discourse, IFES is releasing a series of three white papers introducing a groundbreaking framework for deterring this corrosive practice.
Assessing Electoral Fraud in New Democracies: A Basic Conceptual Framework, the first paper in the series:
- discusses the importance of focusing on fraud in new democracies;
- provides a definition for fraud (as opposed to corruption or malpractice);
- sheds light on the different agents who can perpetrate fraud and why it can be difficult to identify them; and
- assesses how international democratic standards intersect with the prevention of electoral fraud
Tuesday, December 7, 2010
Missing Tally. VEC under review for missing data
The VEC has failed to provide scrutineers and candidates with a list of the number of ballot papers issued for each polling place/voting centre.
Amidst concern that ballot papers may have gone missing or worst still added into the count. Each polling place is required to fill in a declaration return which out lines the number of printed ballot papers they had issued and the number of ballot papers returned. In theory the number of ballot papers issued and the number returned should match. Of course come ballot papers do go missing but this should be recorded on each polling place.
The number of ballot papers issued and returned for the lower house should also match the upper-house as each voter is entitled to two votes.
The VEC should be collecting and collating the information this information which should have been available on the Sunday following the close of the polls. The only unknown quantity is the number of ballot papers that are in the post. (Had the VEC implemented a barcode tacking system available by Australia Post they should also know the number of postal votes)
In the past a scrutineer would have the right to inspect the voting centre return declaration.
In 2006 the VEC failed and refused to make this information available. A copy of the polling place returns requested under FOI was not provided by Steve Tully, Victorian Chief Electoral Officer.
In Western Metropolitan, 2006 the preliminary count showed labor winning the election and a recount was requested. The recount changed the results of the election with the Greens winning a seat at the expense of Labor's fourth seat. One issue that was of considerable concern in the recount was that the second count recorded over 500 less ballot paperswere then was recorded in the primary count. That's 500 ballot papers that were data-entered in wrongly or had gone missing between the two counts. No satisfactory detailed explanation as to where the error had occurred was provided by Steve Tully.
Without access to the tabulated voting centre returns it was impossible to ascertain independently how many ballot papers had been issued and how many returned.
The VEC had been requested to provide a copy of the below the line preference data file for both counts (Count A and Count B) Steve Tully refused to make this data available during and immediately following the count. Copies of the below-the-line preference-data-files were only made available for Count B pursuant to an FOI application. The VEC failed to provide a copy of the data-file recorded for the primary Count B.
Similar problems existed with the 2010 Victorian Senate election, where the AEC refused to provide copies of the below the line preference-data-file to scrutineers. Without access to this data it is impossible for scrutineers to verify the validity and correctness of the data-entry process. The AEC legal officer, Paul Parani, in what was considered an abuse of process, tried to solicit payment of an FOI fee from scutineers in order to gain access to the data-file. Parani tried to claim that the data was only subject to an FOI application. This was not true. This information is a public document and goes to the heart of Australia's electoral process and the need to ensure that the conduct and counting of the election is open and transparent. In not providing this data the electoral process itself is brought into question and disrepute.
There is no legal issue that prevents the publication of of this data. In fact then AEC published the below the line preference data files soon after the declaration of the poll. And in the case of the City of Melbourne election copies of the data files was progressively provided to scrutineers through out the data-entry process
So the question is "why is this data not being made available and what does the Chief Electoral Commision have to hide that he refuses to provide copies of the information requested?"
In the review of the 2006 State election the Victorian Parliament requested that the VEC provide copies of the below-the-line preference data-files and a copy of the polling place return summary. Mr Steve Tully in his evidence given to the Parliament stated that the data for Count A had been deleted and the data overwritten. No back up copies were made and as such he was unable to provide a copy of the data requested. This in spite the requirement of the electoral act that all documents pertaining to the conduct of the election had to be preserved. The fact that the VEC did not make backup copies of the data raised a number of additional questions as to the professionalism and quality of the system put in place. It costs millions of dollars to collate this information and the VEC had no disaster recovery backup process in place.
In 2010 were are seeing the same mistakes being made. The VEC has failed to ensure that the electoral process is open and transparent.
The requirement for an open, transparent and honest election is not too much to ask for. In fact it is expected.
The fact that the VEC is unable to indicate how many ballot papers have been issued and how many returned to date, two weeks after the election, is alarming. The fact that the commission is once again refusing to make available copies of the below-the-line preference-data-files to scrutineers for a second state election in a row brings the electronic counting procedures and tghe VEC into disreputel. It undermines public confidence in our electoral system.
If Steve Tully can not provide copies of the number of ballot papers issued and returned along with copies of the below-the-line preference-data-files to scrutineers then he should be sacked.
Amidst concern that ballot papers may have gone missing or worst still added into the count. Each polling place is required to fill in a declaration return which out lines the number of printed ballot papers they had issued and the number of ballot papers returned. In theory the number of ballot papers issued and the number returned should match. Of course come ballot papers do go missing but this should be recorded on each polling place.
The number of ballot papers issued and returned for the lower house should also match the upper-house as each voter is entitled to two votes.
The VEC should be collecting and collating the information this information which should have been available on the Sunday following the close of the polls. The only unknown quantity is the number of ballot papers that are in the post. (Had the VEC implemented a barcode tacking system available by Australia Post they should also know the number of postal votes)
In the past a scrutineer would have the right to inspect the voting centre return declaration.
In 2006 the VEC failed and refused to make this information available. A copy of the polling place returns requested under FOI was not provided by Steve Tully, Victorian Chief Electoral Officer.
In Western Metropolitan, 2006 the preliminary count showed labor winning the election and a recount was requested. The recount changed the results of the election with the Greens winning a seat at the expense of Labor's fourth seat. One issue that was of considerable concern in the recount was that the second count recorded over 500 less ballot paperswere then was recorded in the primary count. That's 500 ballot papers that were data-entered in wrongly or had gone missing between the two counts. No satisfactory detailed explanation as to where the error had occurred was provided by Steve Tully.
Without access to the tabulated voting centre returns it was impossible to ascertain independently how many ballot papers had been issued and how many returned.
The VEC had been requested to provide a copy of the below the line preference data file for both counts (Count A and Count B) Steve Tully refused to make this data available during and immediately following the count. Copies of the below-the-line preference-data-files were only made available for Count B pursuant to an FOI application. The VEC failed to provide a copy of the data-file recorded for the primary Count B.
Similar problems existed with the 2010 Victorian Senate election, where the AEC refused to provide copies of the below the line preference-data-file to scrutineers. Without access to this data it is impossible for scrutineers to verify the validity and correctness of the data-entry process. The AEC legal officer, Paul Parani, in what was considered an abuse of process, tried to solicit payment of an FOI fee from scutineers in order to gain access to the data-file. Parani tried to claim that the data was only subject to an FOI application. This was not true. This information is a public document and goes to the heart of Australia's electoral process and the need to ensure that the conduct and counting of the election is open and transparent. In not providing this data the electoral process itself is brought into question and disrepute.
There is no legal issue that prevents the publication of of this data. In fact then AEC published the below the line preference data files soon after the declaration of the poll. And in the case of the City of Melbourne election copies of the data files was progressively provided to scrutineers through out the data-entry process
So the question is "why is this data not being made available and what does the Chief Electoral Commision have to hide that he refuses to provide copies of the information requested?"
In the review of the 2006 State election the Victorian Parliament requested that the VEC provide copies of the below-the-line preference data-files and a copy of the polling place return summary. Mr Steve Tully in his evidence given to the Parliament stated that the data for Count A had been deleted and the data overwritten. No back up copies were made and as such he was unable to provide a copy of the data requested. This in spite the requirement of the electoral act that all documents pertaining to the conduct of the election had to be preserved. The fact that the VEC did not make backup copies of the data raised a number of additional questions as to the professionalism and quality of the system put in place. It costs millions of dollars to collate this information and the VEC had no disaster recovery backup process in place.
In 2010 were are seeing the same mistakes being made. The VEC has failed to ensure that the electoral process is open and transparent.
The requirement for an open, transparent and honest election is not too much to ask for. In fact it is expected.
The fact that the VEC is unable to indicate how many ballot papers have been issued and how many returned to date, two weeks after the election, is alarming. The fact that the commission is once again refusing to make available copies of the below-the-line preference-data-files to scrutineers for a second state election in a row brings the electronic counting procedures and tghe VEC into disreputel. It undermines public confidence in our electoral system.
If Steve Tully can not provide copies of the number of ballot papers issued and returned along with copies of the below-the-line preference-data-files to scrutineers then he should be sacked.
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